ABSTRACT. This paper discusses how to define logics as deductive limits of sequences of other logics. The case of da Costa's hierarchy of increasingly weaker paraconsistent calculi, known as C n , 1≤ n≤ ω, is carefully studied. The calculus C ω , in particular, constitutes no more than a lower deductive bound to this hierarchy, and differs considerably from its companions. A long standing problem in the literature (open for more than 35 years) is to define the deductive limit to this hierarchy, that is its greatest lower deductive bound. The calculus C min , stronger than C ω , is first presented as a step towards this limit. As an alternative to the bivaluation semantics of C min presented thereupon, possible-translations semantics are then introduced and suggested as the standard technique both to give this calculus a more reasonable semantics and to derive some interesting properties about it. Possible-translations semantics are then used to provide both a semantics and a decision procedure for C Lim , the real deductive limit of da Costa's hierarchy. Possible-translations semantics also make it possible to characterize a precise sense of duality: as an example, D min is proposed as the dual to C min .
C ω , in particular, constitutes no more than a lower deductive bound to this hierarchy, and differs considerably from its companions. A long standing problem in the literature (open for more than 35 years) is to define the deductive limit to this hierarchy, that is its greatest lower deductive bound. The calculus C min , stronger than C ω , is first presented as a step towards this limit. As an alternative to the bivaluation semantics of C min presented thereupon, possible-translations semantics are then introduced and suggested as the standard technique both to give this calculus a more reasonable semantics and to derive some interesting properties about it. Possible-translations semantics are then used to provide both a semantics and a decision procedure for C Lim , the real deductive limit of da Costa's hierarchy. Possible-translations semantics also make it possible to characterize a precise sense of duality: as an example, Axiomatization. The kernel of each of the calculi C n includes the Intuitionistic Positive Calculus (Int + ), which may be axiomatized by the following sch emas: ∧ G n + 1 . One may understand the formula G (n) as saying that the proposition G is well-behaved, and so (11) may be regarded as a form of paraconsistent reductio ad absurdum and (12) as regulating the propagation of well-behavior.
What about the semantics to the calculi C C C C n , 1 1 1 1≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ n ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ω ω ω ω? Arruda [3] has shown that none of these calculi is characterizable by finite matrices. Nevertheless, they may be characterized by non-truth-functional bivaluations. For a given C n , n<ω, let v n be a function from the well-formed formulas of C n into { 0, 1}, such that:
where # ∈ { ∧ , ∨ , → }.
For each
C n , 1≤ n< ω, we call the function v n so defined an n-valuation. In [14] and [17] the strong soundness and completeness of the semantics given by the set of all such n-valuations is proven. These valuations also help us to show that each C n is strictly weaker than any of its predecessors, i.e. denoting by Th(S) the set of theorems of a calculus S , we have: So why should we call C C C C ω ω ω ω the limit of the hierarchy C C C C n , after all? Under a very reasonable account, we would require that the limit-calculus of that hierarchy, which we shall call C Lim hereafter, has as theorems all and only those theorems which are common to all calculi C n , 1≤n< ω, that is:
But we do not wish to regard the notion of theoremhood as the cornerstone of our definition of a limit-calculus, as we understand that the notion of derivability, reflected on the consequence operators of our logics, is much more fundamental. Here, in a very general perspective, a logic L # will be seen simply as a set (of formulas) L # endowed with a consequence operator, Con # :
. Now, the set L of formulas of all C n coincide. We will require that C Lim should be such that, given any subset Γ of L we have that:
It is immediate to see that (Req 1) is but a particular case of (Req 2), for Th (S ) = Con S (∅) . 
Consequence of axioms (1) and (2), with (MP). (
From , axioms (6), (7), (8) and (MP).
From , axiom (9) and (MP).
From , axiom (10) and (MP).
COROLLARY 2.3 The characteristic function of a G-saturated set of formulas of
gives a min-valuation.
Indeed, let ∆ be a G-saturated set and define a function v such that, for any formula A of 
If C min is not the limit-calculus of C n , it is at least closer to it than C ω . Surely C min and C ω share some properties, such as the uncharacterizability by finite matrices.
Given any C n , n< ω, we may define the strong negation of a formula G, denoted by ~( n) G , as ¬G∧G (n) . It is easy to prove that this negation has all the properties of classical negation (cf. [13] ) and so, for example, the formula G ∧~( 
Now one just has to check that all axioms of C min assume but the distinguished value Ù , for any given valuation, and that (MP) preserves validity. The only difficult case is that of the axiom ¬¬A→A,
It is now easy to verify that in this situation ¬¬A→A is satisfied (and, by the way, A→¬¬A is not satisfied -perhaps these infinitary matrices will validate only the theorems of C min ?).
The ordering relation in the case of the matrices above turns to be the subset relation, ⊆ , that clearly has not a minimal element in the set of values considered.
In [14] and [17] , decision procedures using quasi-matrices were provided to each C n , n< ω. As one might expect from the intricated semantic characterization of C ω given above, quasi-matrices for C ω usually are very complicated (cf. [16] ). Once more, this is not the case for To show the adequacy of this procedure, we prove that, for a given formula G: A possible-worlds semantics for C ω was proposed by Baaz [4] , and it seems that only some minor modifications might be in order to turn this semantics adequate for
min . We will not investigate this problem here. It should be observed, however, that possible-worlds semantics for each C n , n<ω, have still not been produced. How can a formula and its negation both be true? We believe the semantics just given to C min does not help much to explain its paraconsistent behavior. We introduce in the following a new kind of semantics with various interesting properties: Here T and T -are the distinguished values. One may interpret the value T -as "true by default," i.e., by lack of evidence to the contrary. Given two propositions connected by a conjunction, a disjunction or an implication then the matrices above mean that in these cases we can never be completely sure -the evaluation of ∧, ∨ or → will not return the value T. We have two negations, ¬ s and ¬ w : we call the first one strong, and observe that it has a classical behavior, changing definitely the status of propositions -from distinguished to non-distinguished and vice-versa; the other one we call weak, and observe that there is a situation in which we can neither confirm nor disconfirm a proposition -negating a proposition true by default, this negation will return another proposition of the same status. Now let's define the set Tr of all functions * from the formulas of 
We say the pair PT = < 
for all * ∈Tr, we have Γ* 3 A*.
We will call a possible translation of a formula A in C min any image of it through some function in Tr. We may immediately prove the following:
Given a formula A, it is evident that the total number of its possible translations is finitein fact, it is 2 n , where n is the number of negation symbols in A. So here one just has to test all possible translations of each axiom, from (1) to (10) and (DL), and then verify that all possible translations of (MP) preserve validity.
This result assures us that each * in Tr is indeed a translation from Note that THEOREM 3.1 is also provable as a corollary of THEOREM 3.2. Either of the arguments above prove PROPOSITION 3.6. A modified version of Argument 3.6.1 was used in [11] to prove that negated formulas are also not theorems of any C n , unless they have well-behaved subformulas. Note: The syntactic proofs surely require some skill from the reader.
None of them is provable in
C n without the axiom (11n).
Just consider the following matrices:
where and are distinguished.
C n without the axiom (12n).
Just consider the same matrices above, changing only the conjunction for:
Of course, one does not really need to give independence proofs to show these formulas to be not valid in C min . We have two semantics and decision procedures already at our disposal. The formula (DM1), for instance, may be shown to be not valid, either: 
Let's give one more full example of those semantics in action, now to prove that: To see why this formula is provable in any , > and <4 4 4 4 , > of PT, and, conversely, how to transform the pairs <1 Thence, the situation has turned out to be the following:
We conclude that the calculus C min too, though very interesting by itself, is not the desired limit-calculus of What about some history first? Possible-translations semantics can be situated into the more general setting of combinations of logics (for an overview, see [5] , and for a categorial approach of possible-translations semantics, see [8] ). One of us has initially proposed possible-translations semantics as a way of combining logics with well-known many-valued semantics so as to produce interpretations to some non-classical logics (cf. [6] ). A special case of possible-translations semantics is society semantics (cf. [10] ). Possible-translations semantics based on three-valued logics and adequate for interpreting slightly stronger versions of the calculi C n may be found in [7] and [11] , and the hierarchy C n itself is studied in [18] . 
for all * n , we have Γ * n n A * n , i.e. for all n, we have Γ n A.
In such a way, one may refer to the calculus C Lim and to the formulas validated in it. One can indeed provide a decision procedure for the formulas of C Lim. Indeed, as a consequence of (1), the set defined as:
is finite, and we know its content. So we may effectively test all the formulas in it with the three-valued matrices above mentioned (see [11] or [18] ).
The reader should note that while the possible-translations offered for Another limit. So far we have been able to define semantically C Lim , the greatest deductive lower bound of the hierarchy C n , 1≤ n< ω. Surely, now we can look for deductive upper bounds for this same hierarchy.
C
1 would be such an upper bound, as it is strictly stronger than any of the other calculi which follow it.
But let us note that both da Costa and Jaśkowski, commonly held as the founders of paraconsistent logic, intended their paraconsistent calculi to be so strong as to contain most classical schemas and rules compatible with their paraconsistent character (see [13] and [15] ). One such a maximal paraconsistent calculus extending each [20] , and then rediscovered by one of us, in [18] , where one may also learn which axioms may be added to any C n so as to obtain P 1 and P 2 .  Mortensen has also raised the question as to whether there could exist other maximal three-valued paraconsistent logics "sufficiently similar" yet distinct from P 1 and P 2 . The answer is definitely affirmative: We finish this section noting that in [19] the reader may find the axiomatization and the truth-tables of nothing but 2 13 such logics.
6. A dual paracomplete calculus
Possible-translations semantics actually opens to us a new possibility of defining logical systems. We may combine logics for specific needs. Do we have a group of interesting logics whose semantical properties we wish to simultaneously preserve? Then look for a way of combining their semantics. Do we want to build a paraconsistent calculus with a  Actually, in [20] , Mortensen introduced P 2 under the name C 0.2 , but for some reason he insisted that this logic should have only one designated value. Consequently, his completeness proof holds, but the soundness of his system does not hold, for (MP) will not preserve validity. This problem is nevertheless fixed if we pick two designated values, instead of one. More details may be found in [19] . possible-worlds interpretation? Mix possible-worlds interpretations of intuitionistic calculi, as shown in [7] . Do we want a logic that is paraconsistent only at the level of propositions, but not in relation to complex propositions? Carnielli & Lima-Marques [10] have indicated how to combine two copies of classical logic (by means of a particularization of the possible-translations semantics -the so-called society semantics) so as to obtain such a logic, and then have shown that the logic they obtained coincided with P 1 . Possible-translations semantics have also been used to investigate the problem of duality between logical systems (for an overview of this topic, see [21] ). In [10] , the calculi Here T is the only distinguished value. The interpretations to the values and connectives above are "dual" to those given in 3.
This logic has some very interesting properties: 
